Limited Access to the Courts:
An Appraisal of Fee Systems
Although the constitutionality of court fees1 has been extensively discussed in recent years by courts and commentators, 2 and although every
state conditions access to its courts on the payment of fees,4 no systematic attempt has been made to determine either the desired or the
actual effect of these fees on courts or on litigants. 5
1 This comment considers only fees assessed in private civil actions in state and federal
courts of general jurisdiction. Its scope includes all fees related to prosecution of an
action through trial and execution of judgment, but excludes fees related to appeals.
For a discussion of fees and costs in criminal cases see Comment, Charging Costs of
Prosecution to the Defendant, 59 Gao. L.J. 991 (1971); Note, Kansas Court Costs: The
Quality of Mercy is Strained, 9 VAsnmuaN L.J. 87 (1969); Note, Criminal Costs Assessment
in Missouri-Without Rhyme or Reason, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 76.
2 Commentators have frequently argued that court fees for indigents are unconstitutional. E.g., Abram, Access to the Judicial Process, 6 GA. L. Ray. 247 (1972); Goodpaster,
The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and the Indigent's Right of
Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. REy. 223 (1970); Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden
Barrier to the Indigent, 56 GEo. L.J. 516 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Litigation Costs];
Note, A First Amendment Right of Access to the Courts for Indigents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055
(1973). But see Jacoby, Legal Aid to the Poor, 53 HARV. L. REV. 940 (1940). Some commentators have suggested that indigents should be excused from payment of all fees. Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in Civil Cases,
2 VAU'. L. REv. 21 (1968); Willging, FinancialBarriers and the Access of Indigents to the
Courts, 57 Gao. L.J. 253 (1968); Note, Access to the Civil Courts: The Need for Continuing
Reform, 37 ALBANY L. Rav. 135 (1972).

The Supreme Court, however, has found constitutional defects in court fees only under
limited circumstances. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Note, Constitutionality of Cost and Fee Barriers for Indigent Litigants: Searching for the Remains of
Boddie after a Kras-Landing, 48 IND. L.J. 452 (1973). But see Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Earls v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 109, 490 P.2d 814, 98 Cal. Rptr. 302
(1971). See generally Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The
Right to Protect One's Rights (pt. 1), 1973 DuxE L.J. 1153 [hereinafter cited as Access
Fees]; Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment,
83 H~Av. L. Rav. 7 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Protecting the Poor].
3 Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, "state" in this comment includes the
federal government.
4 See Saari, Open Doors to Justice-An Overview of FinancingJustice in America, 50
J. Am. Jun. Soc'Y 296 (1967).
5 But see, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 581, 582 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Ashley v.
Superior Court, 82 Wash. 2d 188, 192, 509 P.2d 751, 755 (1973); 1963 ALAsKA ADm. Din.
Crs. ANN. REP. 65, 66; K. LAy, JuRy FErs iN Cxvm CA
(1956); P. MANLEY, Dis'rmcr
COURT FINANCE IN Naw MExmco (1964); Naw YoRK TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE STATE
COURT SYTE
..... AND JUSTICE FOR ALL, pt. 1, at 70-73 (1973); NEw YoRK TEmnoRARY
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After presenting a descriptive survey of existing fee systems,6 this
comment identifies their principal goals and examines the extent to
which they achieve those goals. In conclusion, the comment suggests
modifications that would increase the effectiveness of court fee systems.
I.

CURRENT FEE SYsTEMs

A. Development of Multiple and Single Fee Systems
Multiple fee schedules derive from an early form of court finance in
which certain officers of the court, such as bailiffs, clerks, and sheriffs,
were compensated by the fees they collected from litigants for performing official duties.7 Current multiple fee systems reflect this derivation by assessing fees primarily for services performed by officers who
were formerly fee compensated,8 while fees are generally not assessed
COMMISSION ON THE COURTS, 1 PRELIMINARY REPORT 42 (1954); NORTH CAROLINA COURTS

COMMISSION REPoRrM5-40 (1965).
6 Fee systems are composed of two elements: the structure of the system-what fees are

assessed and who pays them-and the magnitude of fees imposed within that structure.
This comment focuses primarily on the structure of fee systems, not on the magnitude

of fees.
7 Abuse of this system has led to its abolition in most areas. See H. MoRRIs, THm COUNTY
FEE SYSTEM: A Na, FOR REVIsION 3 (1971); Moore, The Fee System of Public Administra-

tion, 9 OKLA. ST. B.J. -52 (1938).
S The following fee schedule for the district courts of Louisiana illustrates this emphasis:
The clerks of the several district courts shall be entitled to demand and receive
the following fees of office, and no more, in civil matters:
For indorsing, registering, and filing petition, twenty-five cents.
For indorsing, registering, and filing supplemental or amended petition, twenty-five
cents.
For indorsing, registering, and filing answer, twenty-five cents.
For indorsing, registering, and filing amended answer, twenty-five cents.
For copying all instruments of writing or pleadings, not otherwise provided for,
each one hundred words, including seal and certificate thereto, thirty-five cents.
For issuing citations, with seal and certificate, one dollar.
For issuing copy of citation, with seal and certificate, fifty cents.
For issuing writ of attachment, with seal, one dollar.
For issuing copy of writ of attachment, with seal and certificate, fifty cents.
For issuing writ of fieri facias, with seal, two dollars.
For issuing order of seizure and sale or executory process, with seal, two dollars.

For issuing writ of sequestration, with seal, one dollar.

For issuing copy of writ of sequestration, with seal and certificate, fifty cents.
For issuing venire facias in each case in which a jury may be prayed for and

ordered, with seal, one dollar.
For copy of venire facias, with seal and certificate, when ordered and issued, fifty
cents.
For swearing jury, one dollar.
For swearing each witness, twenty-five cents.
For entering final judgment in full on the minutes, fifty cents and thirty-five cents
per hundred words.
For simply entering statement of rendition of final judgment, without copying it in
the minutes, fifty cents.
For every interlocutory judgment entered on the minutes of the court no matter
how many parties, fifty cents.
For each order of court entered on the minutes of courts not otherwise provided
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for services traditionally financed by the state, such as provision of a
courtroom and a judge. In a pure multiple fee system, a litigant would
be assessed a separate fee for each service provided by the court system.
No existing fee system, however, uses this pure form.
The cost of administering a multiple fee system 9 has prompted many
states 0 to adopt single fee systems." Under a pure single fee system,
one charge would cover all court services. Although many existing court
fee systems approach the pure system, 12 each varies from it in some way.
Almost all jurisdictions charge separate fees for service of process, 13
jury trial,14 transcripts, 1 and preparation of the record for appeal,' 6 and
several states assess a fee upon entry of judgment.' 7 Systems also vary in
for, twenty-five cents.
For copies of same, with seal and certificate, fifty cents.
For filing and registering returns on all writs, twenty-five cents.
For issuing notice to creditors of insolvents to attend meetings, with seal and certificate, one dollar.
For issuing copy of notice to creditors of insolvents, with seal and certificate, fifty
cents.
LA. STAT. ANN. ch. 13, § 841 (1968).
9 See text at note 60 infra.
10 E.g., LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION OF THE NEVADA LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, NEVADA's

Coutr STRucruax 37 (1968) (declaring "these detailed small fees merely create additional
bookkeeping... and could ...
be replaced by a single filing fee'). See also NORTH
CAROLINA COURTS SYSTEM, REPogr 38 (1968) (noting that, "as a result of this [multiple fee]
system, the items for which fees are charged continues to expand, the amount of the fees
continues to increase, and the system becomes increasingly cumbersome and confusing").
1' Single fees generally range from $10.00 to $40.00. See statutes cited at notes 18, 19 & 22
infra. The fee often varies with the type of action, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 152

(Supp. 1973) (civil actions, $20.00; marital actions, $15.00; forcible entry and detainer,
$10.00); the amount of the claim, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 34.041 (1974) (on filing claim less
than $100, $3.50; on filing claim greater than or equal to $100 but less than $1000,
$10.00; on filing claim greater than or equal to $1000, $15.00 fee); and the size of the
judgment, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56-5-3 (Supp. 1969) (when case proceeds to trial
and a money judgment greater than $5000 is recovered, additional fee assessed, ranging
from $10.00 for judgments over $5000 but less than $10,000, to $90.00 for judgments of
at least $50,000 with an additional assessment of $2.00 for every $1000 over $50,000).
Many jurisdictions impose additional fees on litigants to fund noncourt services. See, eg.,
ALA. CODE tit. 11, § 83(1) (Supp. 1973) ($2.00 "fair trial tax" to finance fund for payment
of indigents' litigation expenses); InAno CODE § 75-213 (1973) ($4.00 tax to fund state code
revision commission); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 1702a-1 (Supp. 1974) ($2.50 fee to support
county law library). One study has commented that "[t]hese assessments are difficult to
defend in principle, since the court system is taxing certain persons brought before the
court for [services] ... which, theoretically, benefit everyone." 1972 JuD. COUNCIL OF CALIF.
ANN. RrP., at A-109.
12 E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 152 et seq. (Supp. 1973) ($20.00 single fee); TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. art. 3930(b) (Supp. 1974) ($10.00 fee in county courts).
13 E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2558 (Supp. 1974) ($3.00 plus traveling costs).
14 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-258 (Supp. 1973) ($40.00); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 494.160
(1949) ($12.00).
15 E.g., Micu. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2543 (Supp. 1974) (250 per folio).
16 Eg., id. § 27A.2546 ($1.00 per page).
17 E.g., id. § 27A.2528 ($10.00).
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the allocation of fees between the parties18 and in the timing of fee
assessment.' 9
B.

Common Characteristics of Multiple and Single Fee Systems
Multiple and single fee systems have several characteristics in common. First, courts are heavily subsidized under both fee systems.2
Compared with the cost of providing court services, 21 court fees are
nominal. 22 Second, since the structure of a fee system and the magnitude
of the fees imposed are generally established by statute,23 legislative
action is required to create new fees or to modify existing ones. 24 Third,
18 In several jurisdictions, the plaintiff pays a portion of the total fee on-filing a complaint, and the defendant pays the balance on filing an answer. Eg., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-311 (Supp. 1973) ($20.00 on filing complaint, $10.00 on filing answer); COLO. RY.
STAT. ANN. § 56-5-1 (Supp. 1969) ($25.00 on filing complaint, $12.50 on filing answer).
19 For example, only a portion of the fee might be assessed on filing a complaint, with
the remainder due only if the case proceeds to trial. E.g., S.D. Coaampi
LAws ANN.
§ 16-10-8 (Supp. 1973) ($5.00 on filing, $3.00 on trial; if jury trial, $5.00 on filing, $5.00 on
trial).
20 It can be argued that civil litigants are not subsidized by taxpayers, but by those

who pay fines and forfeit bail. In many areas, total revenues generated by courts exceed
total costs. In California, for example, the operating cost of all trial courts for fiscal 1972
was $130.7 million, while revenues of the system were $161.5 million. 1972 Jun. COUNCIL
oF CAL. ANN. REP., at A-13.
21 Accurately estimating the extent to which fees recover costs (the "recovery ratio')
is difficult. The necessary data on fee income and civil court costs are often unavailable.
Court financial statements usually aggregate income from all sources, such as civil fees,
criminal cost assessments, fines, and bail forfeitures, while operating statements rarely
categorize expenses into civil and criminal components. In one jurisdiction where sufficient information is available to calculate the ratio, it appears that fees recover less than
eight percent of costs. 1971 MAss. Sup. JuD. Cr. ANN. RE. 47-53 (Superior Court of Suffolk County). These figures probably underestimate the recovery ratio because the government, as litigant, customarily does not pay fees. Thus, a portion of the government
subsidy can be considered a payment in lieu of fees. See also NEw YoRK TEMPOaARY"
COMMISSION ON

THE CouRTs,

supra note 5 at 21.

When no appeal is taken, total fees rarely exceed $50.00. E.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 56-5-1 (Supp. 1969) ($37.50 plus variable judgment fee, district court); CONN. G-N. STAT.
ANN. § 52-259 (Supp. 1973) ($45.00, entry fee, superior court); IOWA CODE ANN. § 606.15
(Supp. 1974) ($9.00, average case, district court); MAsS. ANN. LAws ch. 262 § 4 (1968)
($5.00, superior court). The policy of assessing only nominal fees for civil litigants is to
be contrasted with the policy of many jurisdictions of assessing convicted criminal defendants the actual costs of their prosecution. See Aldisert, A Metropolitan Court Conquers Its Backlog (pts. 1-3), 51 J. Am. Jun. Soc'Y 202, 247, 298 (1968).
23 See statutes cited at notes 8 & 11-19 supra. Several legislatures have delegated to
courts the power to determine fee structures and amounts. E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 22.05.020
(1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8708 (Supp. 1970) (chancery).
24 Court service levels are effectively determined by legislative appropriations. See
Hazard, McNamara & Sentilles, Court Finance and Unitary Budgeting, 81 YALE L.J. 1286
(1972). Although legislative decisions on court funding are generally unreviewable, courts
have successfully brought writs of mandamus to compel adequate appropriations in a
22

few instances of inadequate funding. See Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 383
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most systems require prepayment of fees unless security has been
posted.2 5 Fourth, the prevailing party usually recovers any fees he has
paid from the losing paty.26 Fifth, most states have in forma pauperis
the security deposit or fee
statutes or other special provisions waiving
27
prepayment requirements for indigents.
II.

CRm Ru OF EFFECTIVE FEE SYSTEMS

Legislative documents, 28 the literature applying economic analysis
to the courts,2 9 and general theories of politics and economics30 indicate
that an effective fee system should be directed toward three general
goals: allocation and conservation of resources, consonance with state
social policies, and administrative feasibility. The effectiveness of a
particular fee system can be measured by its success in achieving these

goals.
Fees, like all prices, can be used to allocate and conserve resources.
The basic resources used to produce court services, principally labor,
could be used alternatively to produce other goods and services. In the
market, consumers make their preferences known through their willingMich. 10, 172 N.W.2d 436 (1969), modified on rehearing, 886 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228
(1971); Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193 (1971).
25 E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2528(l) (Supp. 1974).
26 E.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 22A:2-8 (1969); WIS. SrAT. ANN. § 271.04(2) (1958).
27 Silverstein, supra note 2, at 33. In some states, all fees are waived; in others, fees are

waived for only a limited number of services. Id. Moreover, some statutes allow a state
to assess waived fees if the indigent succeeds in litigation or later ceases to be indigent.
Litigation Costs, supra note 2, at 524 n.55.
28 See, e.g., 1972 NEw YoRK LEG. ANN. 1, 32; LEG IsLATVE COMMSION OF TE NEVADA
Lr.IsLATcvE COUNSEL BUREAU, supra note 10 at 37; RHODE ISLAND SPECIAL COMMISSION TO
STuDY AND REVISE THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, INTERIM REPORT 12 (1959); authorities cited note
5 supra.
29 See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 820-56 (1972); Landes, An Economic
Analysis of Courts, 14 J. LAw & EcoN. 61 (1971); Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. IG. STUDMIEs 399 (1978); Posner, Taxation
by Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGain. Scr. 22 (1971).
30 See, e.g., Brownlee, User Prices vs. Taxes in PUBLIc FINANCE-NEEDS, SOURCES, AND
UTILIZrONS 421 (1961); Round Table, Taxes and User Charges in Government Finance,
1955 PRoc. NAT'L TAX Assoc. 189 (1956); Brownlee, The Economics of Government

Expenditures: Using Market Mechanisms in Making Government Expenditure Decisions,
49 Am. EcoN. REv. 359 (Proceedings 1959); Vandermuelen, Five Canons for Setting State
Fees, 4 W. EcON. J. 216 (1966); See also R. MuscRAvz, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE
(1959); Backman & Kurnow, Pricing of Government Services, 7 NAT'L TAX J. 121 (1954);
Davies, Financing Urban Functions and Services, 80 LAw & CONTEMP.

PROB.

127 (1965);

Robinson, Benefits Received Financing in the Federal Fiscal System, 17 NATL TAX J.
241 (1964); Stockfisch, Fees and Service Charges as a Source of City Revenues: A Case
Study of Los Angeles, 18 NAT'L TAX J. 97 (1960); Stockfisch, The Outlook for Fees and
Service Charges as a Source of Revenue for State and Local Governments, 1967 Paoe.
NAT'L TAX Assoc. 86 (1968); Ture, An Appraisalof New Revenue Sources, 25 NAT'L TAX J.
451 (1972); Vandermuelen, Reform of a State Fee Structure, 17 NAr'L TAx J. 394 (1964).
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ness to pay more for particular uses of resources; producers react by
allocating resources to satisfy these demands.3 1 By establishing fees (as
producers establish prices) and by reacting to consumer demand (as
producers react), states can use the market mechanism to provide a
proper allocation of resources to courts.
For example, private arbitration might be able to resolve a particular
class of dispute at a lower-real cost than the courts. Resources would
thus be misallocated if courts were used to resolve these disputes instead
of arbitration. If the fee for the courts and the price of arbitration each
reflect the respective costs of those services, a proper allocation of
resources will occur as consumers select the less costly alternative of
arbitration. 2 But if government sets the price of court services below
cost, resources would be misallocated.
Fees may also help court administrators allocate resources within the
court system. For example, although an administrator may believe that
funds should be spent to relieve court delay, litigants may actually
prefer delay.3 3 One commentator has suggested that court fees, through
the market mechanism, can be used to determine litigants' preferences
by indicating whether they are willing to pay the cost of reducing
delay. 4
In addition to providing a basis for allocating resources to the courts,
an effective fee system can also deter waste of those resources.3 5 Court
fees, like all prices, motivate consumers to compare the benefits they
31 The scarce supply of all resources necessitates their allocation among goods and
services, and that allocation is accomplished through the price component of the market
mechanism. Efficient allocation occurs only in a perfectly competitive economy, where
transactions are costless and firms can freely shift production from one good to another
without delays. But time lags do occur in shifting production, transactions are costly, and
competition is imperfect in many lines of commerce. As a result, the actual market allocation of resources is somewhat less efficient than allocations in the perfect competition
model.
32 The example assumes that the two methods of dispute resolution are identical
products from the consumer's viewpoint.
33 See Rosenberg & Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation,
59 CoLum. L. REv. 1115, 1139 (1959).
34 Delay is not due to the fact that the demand for litigation is high and the amount
of judge time limited. The demand for potatoes is also high and the capacity to
expand production to meet new increments of demand also limited. People queue up
to buy litigation but not to buy potatoes because judicial time is not rationed by
price and potatoes are.... If the prices necessary to clear the market (eliminate
the queue) were very high, it would be a signal that an investment of resources in
hiring more judges would probably be cost justified. The prices might not be high.
Perhaps only a small fraction of litigants have sufficient interest in an early trial
to pay a surcharge ....
But we will never know in the absence of a price mechanism
for measuring the intensity of demand.
R. PosNER, supra note 29, at 355 (emphasis added). See generally Robinson, supra note
30; Stockfisch, supra note 30.
35 See generally Vandermuelen, supra note 30.
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derive from a service with iti cost. When services are free,36 consumers
are not forced to make this comparison; they have no incentive to
conserve resources, because additional consumption costs nothing. Thus,
fees reflecting the real cost of providing court services would help
deter waste.
The second goal of an effective fee system, consonance with social
policies, derives from the general proposition that all state policies and
state actions should be coordinated in order to maximize citizen welfare.
Court fee systems should therefore not conflict with social policies
established by legislation, through court decisions, in state constitutions,
or through implicit popular consensus.
Finally, an effective fee system must be administratively feasible. Fee
systems generate various operating costs-for example, fees must be
collected, recorded, and deposited in a bank. Although economists often
simplify their analysis by ignoring operating costs, 7 a practical appraisal
of fee systems requires consideration of these costs.
III.

EFFECTrIVENESS OF CURRENT FEE SYSTEMS

The most effective fee system would maximize each of the three
general goals. Yet these goals may often conflict,38 and no fee system

can maximize all three simultaneously. Evaluating the effectiveness of
particular characteristics of fee systems thus requires not only an
analysis of each characteristic's effect on each goal, but also of its effect
on the interaction among goals.
A.

Effectiveness of Common Characteristics of Multiple and Single
Fee Systems

1. Nominal Fees. As noted earlier, 9 fees that reflect only a small
portion of actual court costs can interfere with resource allocation by
making courts more attractive than alternate dispute resolution services
36 A good may be considered free not only when its initial distribution is without
charge, but also when it is available in unlimited quantities at a fixed price. In the latter
instance, consumption may be considered free because it costs an individual who has
paid the fixed fee nothing to consume additional quantities of the good.
37 See Davies, supra note 30, at 158-60.
38 For example, the fee system that best allocates resources may have a high administrative cost, and a system that completely eliminates waste may conflict with established
policy. For each conflict, competing social policies must be balanced to determine, for
example, if a $500,000 annual savings in administrative cost would be worth denying
relief to 500 plaintiffs per year. These conflicts must be resolved by balancing the various
goals. The resolution is usually accomplished through the political process, but some
conflicts can be resolved mechanically if the alternatives can be reduced to dollar cost
comparisons.
39 See text and notes at notes 32 & 36 supra.
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with lower real costs. Nevertheless, such distortion arising from subsidization may be justified if promoting certain social policies is considered more important than achieving appropriate allocation of
resources.
One-policy furthered by subsidization of litigation is society's interest
in assuring the trial of a sufficient number of cases to develop and enforce rules of conduct.4 0 Society may also consider market distribution
of court services inappropriate, given the special nature of those services.
Unlike most market goods or services, which are simply property,
courts are a means of preserving rights in property.41 Subsidization
helps assure all citizens equal access to the courts to protect those
rights. 42 A third social policy supporting subsidization is the maintenance of state control over dispute resolution. If courts are not subsidized, litigants may choose other less costly means of dispute
resolution, such as arbitration or self-help. Assuming a strong social
interest in confining most dispute resolution to the courts, a system of
nominal fees may be effective even though the resulting inappropriate
allocation of resources is costly.
2. Statutory Establishment of Fees and Service Levels. Courts operate
in a dynamic environment in which exogenous shocks may change the
demand for litigation and the cost of providing court services. 48 Setting
fees and service levels by statute interferes with resource allocation
40

[Tjhe allocative function of the legal system suggests a possible economic justifica-

tion for government's defraying a portion of the costs of the system

....

If the

function of the legal system were solely to settle disputes, it would be appropriate
to impose the entire costs of the system on the disputants. But that is not its only
function. It establishes rules of conduct designed to shape future conduct, not only
the present disputants' but also other people's. Since the social benefits of a litigation may exceed the private benefits to the litigants, the amount of litigation might
be too small if the litigants had to bear the total costs of the suit.
R. PosNER, supra note 29, at 322-23.
Governments may thus subsidize courts, reducing fees to the level at which the amount
of litigation demanded produces just enough social benefits to satisfy society's demand
for these benefits. Resource allocations in this scheme could still be determined by the
market; the government would effectively lower the price through subsidization and induce the market to allocate more resources to courts than it would absent subsidization.
41 Michelman, Access Fees, supra note 2. In an earlier work, Professor Michehman explored the notion that access to courts may be a "just" or "basic" want that all citizens
may demand on equal grounds. Michelman, Protecting the Poor, supra note 2, at 13.
4:2 The number of citizens with access is a function of the size of the subsidy. The
value of access, of course, may be undercut by long delays in processing claims that
must receive prompt consideration.
48 A change in legal doctrine, such as the move toward strict products liability, can
cause shifts in demand for legal services. See Casper & Posner, A Study of the Supreme
Court's Caseload, 3 J. Io. STurns 339, 346-49 (1974). Similarly, fluctuations in the cost
of inputs, such as labor, can change the cost of providing court services.
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by impeding adjustment to these changes. Statutes authorizing courts
to establish and modify fees can alleviate this problem, because courts
can adjust fees with minimal delay" and can generally behave as a
private firm in setting prices 4 5
When legislatures control fee systems, the administrative cost is
high; decision making requires the time of many individuals and the
resources of the legislative process. Administrative decision making,
by contrast, is typically less time consuming and involves fewer individuals. If there were significant advantages to legislative decision
making, the additional costs of the legislative process could be justified;
but legislative decision making on court fees has few advantages.
3. Prepayment Requirement. The administrative cost of requiring
prepayment of court fees is considerably less than the administrative
cost of deferring fee collection until the dispute is resolved. A prepayment requirement places court operations on a cash basis and does
not require the states to extend interest-free credit to litigants. Moreover, since most cases are resolved before trial,4 filing may be the only
convenient time to collect the fee. Delayed collection is costly; the state
must locate the parties who settle or fail to prosecute and may be forced
in some cases to take legal action to collect fees or to write off a portion
of fees as uncollectible. A prepayment requirement is a more efficient
collection procedure.
4. Fee Burden on the Losing Party. Placing the final burden of fees
on the losing party may cause a misallocation and a waste of resources.
In purchasing court services that may be demanded by one party
without the consent of the other, a litigant will evaluate his cost not
by the amount of the fee, but rather by the amount of the fee discounted by his estimate of the probability that he will win.4 7 The
44 For examples of statutory schemes in which the authority to set fees is delegated
to the courts, see note 23 supra.
45 The courts could simulate the behavior of a private firm in a competitive market
by setting the price of court services equal to their marginal cost. If the courts acted as
a private monopolist, however, they would maximize net revenues by setting prices
above marginal costs, providing fewer services, and reaping monopoly profits. This
would be an inefficient allocation of resources. See R. PosNxa, supra note 29, at 104-07.
48 In fiscal years 1969 through 1971, 257,910 civil actions were filed in the United
States district courts. 1972 Di. AnM. OFF. U.S. Crs. ANN. REP. 119 [hereinafter cited as
1972 REP RT]. Yet during fiscal 1970-72, civil trials totalled only 30,504. Id. at 159. This
indicates that in federal courts, approximately 11.4 percent of cases filed proceed to
trial.
47 For example, a litigant who believes he has a 25 percent chance of winning his
case will consider a $100 jury fee to cost only $75. The litigant will calculate his cost as
the amount of the fee multiplied by the probability of paying it, in this case $100 X .75.
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apparent cost will always be lower than the actual fee,48 thus causing
litigants to purchase more optional services than if the apparent cost
were equal to the full amount of the fee. A litigant who is virtually
certain of winning may request court services with impunity, since he
knows he will not have to pay for them.
Conversely, assessing the losing party all fees may encourage conservation of resources. First, the rule might prompt potential losers to
settle out of court, decreasing the number of trials. Second, it may
foster conservation by forcing those contemplating wrongful acts to
consider court fees as part of the cost of their prospective actions.49 A
rational man will commit an act only when its benefits exceed its costs.
Incorporating court costs into the cost-benefit analysis may encourage
a would-be wrong-doer to forego the wrongful act. 0
5. Provisionsfor Indigent Litigants. Waiving court fees for indigents
presents several problems. First, exempting indigents from payment
of fees reduces their incentive to conserve resources.Y Waiver of fees
allows indigents to litigate nominal or frivolous claims, 52 while others
are deterred by fees from litigating similar claims. Second, administering waiver provisions is costly because it requires the use of judicial
time, the scarcest resource of the legal system, to determine whether a
53
claimant qualifies for the waiver.
Waiver provisions may be justified, however, by social policies favoring equal availability of services to all citizens54 or a redistribution of
55
wealth.
48 This assertion will be valid for every litigant who perceives some probability of

winning his case.
49 This discussion assumes, of course; that parties contemplating wrongful acts are
deterred, to some degree, by the legal system's sanctions. This may be less true for civil
than for criminal acts, since an individual may be less able to predict whether his act
is civilly actionable than whether it violates a criminal statute.
50 Economists have suggested that rules of tort and contract law do not prevent commission of all wrongful acts, but only those that are not cost-justified. See generally
Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEG. Srouais 323 (1973).
51 See text at note 85 supra.
52 Bringing suit will cost the indigent only his time if attorney's fees and other legal

services are provided without charge. Prescreening by judges and legal aid services may
eliminate frivolous suits brought to harass another party, but it will not eliminateand probably is not designed to eliminate-valid suits with relatively inconsequential
stakes. The usual standard is the merit of the case, not whether it economically justifies
an investment of resources.
53 At least one judge has lamented the time-consuming nature of those decisions.
Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L. Rxv. 1270, 1286 (1966).
54 See text at note 42 supra.

55 Distribution of services in kind may be a less efficient means of equalizing the distribution of wealth than comprehensive tax or grant programs. These latter programs
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Multiple Fee Systems

By selling each service separately, a multiple fee system provides
information that permits administrators to measure litigant demand
for each service and allocate resources accordingly. 56 A pure multiple
fee system would be most efficient, because it provides this information
for all court services. Existing multiple fee systems are less efficient,
because they do so for only a limited number of services. 57 This inefficiency may be offset to some extent, however, by a social policy that
certain components of court services, such as the jury 8 or the trial itself,
are inappropriate for market distribution. 9
A multiple fee system effectively allocates and conserves resources
only if its fees reflect actual costs. Those costs include not only the
costs of the services provided, but also the administrative costs of the
fee system itself.60
C.

Single Fee Systems

Although the pure single fee system is easy to administer and relatively inexpensive, it interferes with efficient allocation and conservation
of resources because it ignores differential utilization of court servicds.
A pure single fee system does ration consumption of court services;
litigants are encouraged to use more services than if separate payment
were required for each. 6 ' This problem has led to divergence from the
pure system; many existing single fee systems isolate certain items,
62
such as juries, and charge separately for them.
would involve a more uniform redistribution of wealth, since waiver of court fees affects
only indigents who demand court services.
56 See text at note 33 supra.
57 Trial-related services, which are usually not charged for separately, cost hundreds
of dollars. See 1973 Jui. COUNCIL OF CALIF. ANNq. Ra. 106 ($665 daily cost for civil
jury trial excluding jury fees); K. LAU, supra note 5, at 7 ($750 per day, New York state
jury trial); Reardon Civil Docket Congestion-A Massachusetts Answer, 89 B.U.L. REy.
297, 303 (1959) ($650-$750 daily cost for jury trial).
58 Jury fee statutes have been assailed periodically, see Knee v. Baltimore City Passenger Ry., 87 Md. 623, 627, 40 A. 890, 892 (1898), usually on the ground that they
violate the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the seventh amendment or similar provisions in state constitutions. Yet courts have consistently held that the right is "not a
right to command the services of a jury without cost but is of the same nature as the
right to have official services performed by public officers, and a requirement for the
payment of a reasonable amount for jury fees ... is not a denial or encroachment upon
the right." Morrison Hotel & Restaurant Co. v. Kirsner, 245 Ill. 431, 433, 92 N.E. 285, 286
(1910); accord, Conneau v. Geis, 73 Cal. 176, 177, 14 P. 580, 581 (1887); People ex rel.
Flanagan v. McDonough, 24 IlL. 2d 178, 180-81, 180 N.E.2d 486, 487 (1962).
59 Cf. Michelman, Protectingthe Poor, supra note 2, at 18.
60 See text and notes at notes 82-37 supra.
61 See text and notes at notes 35-86 supra.
62 See text and notes at notes 13-17 supra.
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Separate trial fees, however, may deter parties who have filed suit
from proceeding to trial. This deterrent effect would conflict with
the state's need for trials to establish rules of conduct and with its interest in monopolizing dispute resolution.
The Optimal Fee System
As noted earlier6 3 conflicts exist among the general goals, and no fee
system can accomplish all three goals simultaneously. An optimal system
could nonetheless be defined if a common unit of measure could be
applied to each goal; the optimum would then be attained by maximizing the single summed value of all the goals. Unfortunately, no
common measure can be applied to these goals, because each goal has
two effects, only one of which can be objectively measured. The first
effect is on real costs, which are lowered, for example, when a system
of greater administrative feasibility or more efficient resource allocation
is instituted. The second effect is on social costs, which are lower, for
example, in a system that furthers a social policy of redistributing
wealth. The first effect is tangible and can be objectively evaluated,
but the second effect is intangible and amenable to only subjective
evaluation. Thus, although it is impracticable to define an optimal
system with respect to total costs, both real and social, it would be
possible to define an optimal system with respect to real costs alone.
This optimum would exist when real costs are minimized.
Implementing this theoretical concept is not easy; it is unlikely that
an optimal system could actually be devisedand put into use. The
preceding analysis of multiple and single fee systems, however, suggests
one means of minimizing real costs. As that analysis indicated, single
fee systems tend to sacrifice conservation and allocation benefits to
attain savings in administrative cost, while multiple fee systems tend to
sacrifice administrative cost savings to attain conservation and allocation
benefits. By breaking apart some of the services sold as a unit under the
single fee system, and by grouping and selling as a single unit some of
the services sold separately in the multiple fee system, it may be possible to develop a new system that operates at a lower net real cost than
either existing system. The problem is one of creating bundles of
services that are highly associated, in that litigants who purchase one
service are likely to purchase all other services within the group as well.
Ascertaining the degree of association among various court services
is difficult, but one modification in court fee systems is suggested by
D.

o Seetextand note at note 88 supra.
64 For example, factors such as the complexity of a particular cause of action or the
number of parties involved can cause wide variations in the use of court services.
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a basic pattern of association among court services. First, all litigants
utilize pretrial services, such as those related to filing and docketing an
action. An individual who purchases one pretrial service is likely to
purchase all such services. But a relatively small number of litigants
reach trial, and there is wide variation in their use of trial-related
services. 5 A fee system could become more effective by utilizing two fees
based on these patterns of association.6 6
The first fee would be an entry fee, similar to a filing fee, and would
cover all pretrial services. Since the additional nontrial services available
to a litigant after filing are relatively few and relatively inexpensive,
use of a single fee reflecting the average costs of pretrial processing
would not significantly encourage waste or misallocation of resources.
The second fee would apply only to litigants who proceed to trial.
Unlike the entry fee, which would be the same for all cases, the trial
fee would vary with the length of the trial and the use of a jury. A fixed
rate for each day or half day of trial, supplemented by a surcharge for
use of a jury, would probably be most efficient. Although this system
would be more costly to administer than one utilizing a single fixed
trial fee, the additional cost would be justified, because the system
would conserve court resources by discouraging unnecessarily lengthy
trials. 7
CONCLUSION

An analysis of court fee systems and their three general goals-allocation and conservation of resources, consonance with social policies, and
administrative feasibility-suggests that an effective fee system would
group all court services into two bundles. Services from the time of
filing until trial would be purchased with a single fee common to all
cases; a second fee would cover trial services, varying with the length
of trial and the use of a jury. This system combines the resource
allocation and conservation characteristics of a multiple fee system with
the administrative efficiency of a single fee system.
The high cost of deferred collection of the fee for pretrial services
justifies a prepayment requirement. If the plaintiff prevails, however,
05 1972 RXPORT, supra note 46, at 159. This is indicated by the duration of the 18,700
civil actions tried in United States district courts during fiscal 1972: 27.7 percent of the
actions were tried in less than one day; 25.8 percent lasted one day; 22.4 percent lasted
two days; 10.5 percent lasted three days; 12.1 percent lasted between four and nine days;
and 1.5 percent lasted ten days or more.
66 At least one jurisdiction has incorporated this pattern into its fee system. See note
19 supra.
67 Litigation costs other than court fees will be considerable in most cases, and thus
will also deter the unwarranted use of additional trial resources.
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the judgment should include prepaid fees. Assessment of the trial
charge must necessarily await the end of the trial, when it would be
collected from the losing party. Placing the fee burden on the losing
party is justified on efficiency and policy grounds.
Nicholas A. Perensovich

